کابل پرس

The Political Aspects of APTTA

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2021-01-31T06:37:46Z

Abstract

The APTTA renewal between Pakistan and Afghanistan has always increased concern in the light of developing political scenario. This article evaluates the forthcoming challenges and hurdles during the renewal process of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). The agreement expires on February 11, 2021. The article evaluates the two major hurdles
A) First, the technical and procedural problems, like cessation of informal trade, effective usage of Information Technology (tracking devices of goods, vehicular tracking systems etc.), banking guarantees, and special bonded carrier licenses for transit trucks, container security deposits, and all other logistics and customs procedures, better working relationship and communication between the relevant authorities.
B) Political and security concerns of both parties, particularly Pakistan. The first set of problems seems to be negotiated smoothly but the second problem might be a real bone of contention. It is the inclusion of India into this agreement or at least the provision of Indian access to Afghanistan via Wagah Border. On this issue, both Afghanistan and Pakistan stand on opposite sides.

Introduction

In spite of sharing the longest border, having much in common in religion, culture and language on both sides of the border, naturally locked in interdependency in the various key areas like economy and security, both Pakistan and Afghanistan could never acquire a smooth level of relationship.
The root causes of this discontent in the mutual relations between both neighbors have varying perceptions in their geopolitical realm, sometimes difficult to sum it up in a small article. But the fact cannot be denied that both countries geographically locked into each as neighbors will keep affecting a degree of consensus, though at times an uneasy one, in terms of security policy and economic cooperation between both the states. Notwithstanding the fact that both governments could not maintain a desirable level of relations, still millions of legal and illegal refugees prefer Pakistan as their second home and tens of thousands of Afghan children are being educated there. In addition to that thousands more are busy in licit and illicit businesses in Pakistan.
No doubt that Pakistan and Afghanistan have their own unique geopolitical and geo-economic strategic importance, it would be improper for both countries to undermine the other. Pakistan is a junction of South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia with ample of coastline along the Arabian Sea which is of high importance and enables it to be an important hub for the transit trade to Afghanistan, china and the CARs. On the other hand, Afghanistan, though a landlocked country, has been known as a cultural crossroads of the Indian, Persian and Chinese civilizations, it has significant geostrategic and geopolitical importance by connecting East and West Asia or the Middle East to Central Asia, not to mention that it is the home of approx. over one trillion US dollars' worth of untapped precious mineral deposits.

If Pakistan has one of the largest armies in the world and it is the only Islamic nuclear power state, the dilemma occurs when lasting peace in Afghanistan is only possible with mutual security consensus between both the states but for Pakistan not compromising on its own geopolitical concerns in the changing security, political and geo-economic dynamics of the region, the vicious cycle of instability seems to remain unresolved. As for Afghanistan, being the heart of Asia, as the poet of the East Allamah Muhammad Iqbal acknowledged it; its destabilization bears direct consequences on the region. In other words, Afghanistan's instability factor alone would be enough to seek its nuisance among the regional players at least, if it could not do much to prove itself otherwise, particularly, when Afghanistan lacks the capacity to contain trans-border spillover of its internal security problems.

Both countries can play important role in the stability of South and Central Asia. Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan has been dependent on its neighbors for transit trade and the provision of the basic necessities, from food items, petroleum products up to basic medicines. Amid the continuous civil war, it still exports fresh and dried fruits, carpets and other textile floor covering. Although. In spite of the huge investment in blood and money by the international community over the last two decades, Afghanistan still faces a huge trade imbalance. According to the available data from WTO, the trade deficit of Afghanistan in 2018 was US$ 6.4 billion with US$ 1.2 billion imports and the exports were only US$ 485 million which is -32.72% of the GDP. In 2019, the situation improved a little bit and this deficit decreased to -30.11% of the GDP .

Pakistan, Iran, China and India are the main trading partners of Afghanistan. Till 2013 Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan was at its peak by US$ 2.1 Billion but after that, the graph shows a decline in the mutual trade between the two countries. At the moment, Pakistan is the top export partner of Afghanistan with US$ 379million (43%) and India with US$ 359 million (41%) stay at number two but as far as imports are concerned Iran and China overtook Pakistan with US$ 1.26 billion and US$ 1.17 billion respectively. Pakistan stands third as the importing partner of Afghanistan by US$ 1.09 billion. Afghanistan's import from India is US$ 359.47 million.

From “ATTA” to “APTTA”

The first transit trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan signed on March 02, 1965. Although, it was a bilateral treaty but officially it was called “Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement” and according to that treaty Pakistan was not given the access to the then USSR while Afghanistan had the access to the ports of Pakistan, mainly the Karachi seaport which is the shortest and most cost-effective route to access the regional and the world market. In that agreement Afghanistan was not given the facility to access India by land route. For Pakistan the agreement was not balanced because it was not given reciprocal access to the USSR and after its collapse in the 90s, to the Central Asian Republics (CARs).

In the post-Taliban Afghanistan ATTA was replaced by the “Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement” which was signed by the commerce minister of both countries on October 28, 2010, in Kabul. This time the agreement was much more comprehensive with 58 articles and two annexes specifying exit-entry routes and four protocols with all the relevant technical and legal details.
By this agreement, Pakistan was given access to the CARs from three main points and Afghanistan was allowed access to Pakistan's seaports as well as to the Wagah Border for its exports to India but does not allow Indian Exports to Afghanistan through Wagah Land Border.
The international community and the United Nations welcomed and appreciated the agreement and called it a positive step toward the promotion of mutual trade and relations.
In addition to the traditional Red-Tapism and the corruption in border and customs authorities, there were always two problems that were raised time and again by both sides.
Pakistan was always concerned about the illegal and informal trade which costs Pakistan a huge sum of money annually as well as it had a bad impact on the Pakistani domestic industry and trade. It has been really a big challenge for Pakistan to control its more 2600 km porous border to control these illicit trade activities.
The second issue was Afghanistan's persistent demand that India should be given access for its exports to Afghanistan through Pakistani land routes. Pakistan has never responded positively to this Afghan demand due to the legal aspects of the agreement as well as the security concerns.

Informal Trade

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Pakistan is uniquely challenged by the nexus between crime and the illegal economy due to its geographic location. The country's relations with its neighbors, particularly Afghanistan, are complicated by cross-border criminality, which in turn creates a thriving regional illegal economy orchestrated by complex informal and formal organized criminal networks of supplier rings, wholesalers, financiers, protectors and patrons. The situation within the region has implications for the broader global community as the risks created by illegal and criminal economic activities spread and multiply far beyond. For example, illegal drug trafficking risks human health globally; illegal trade that funds insurgencies poses not just local and regional security challenges but also to more distant locations. The report also says that Afghanistan's illicit trade is still the major source of income. While the illegal economy raises the cost for conducting legal economic activities, it also weakens states, threatens development opportunities, undermines the rule of law, and keeps countries trapped in a cycle of poverty and instability.

A research paper by the Pakistan Strategy Support Program (PSSP) writes the details that how the goods destined for Afghanistan under the APTTA, upon arrival at the Karachi port, pay no duties, after which they are loaded onto trucks that transit Pakistani territory to reach Afghanistan via Chaman or Torkham (border crossing points). After arrival in Afghanistan, the merchandise is smuggled back to Pakistan.

According to CIDOB, the informal (non-opium) trade including smuggling (electronics, car parts, semi-precious stones, carpet, livestock, and foodstuffs). Informal trade reportedly accounts annually for US$ 1.5 billion, with smuggling accounting for US$1 billion. The same report mentions that “Lack of justice and rule of law, of which informal economies are a part, are a greater threat to Afghanistan than insurgency”.
Abdul Razak Dawood, the adviser to the Pakistani Prime Minister on Commerce and Investment depicts more serious situation. As said by him, the volume of informal trade between the countries was UD$ 2 billion in 2019.

But bad news for the smugglers and the people engaged in illegal trade across the Pak-Afghan border, Inter-Services Public Relations, or ISPR (The media wing of the Pakistan Army) said that the barrier has already been installed along “about 83 percent” of the western Pakistani frontier. Additionally, hundreds of new outposts and forts have been built under the roughly $500 million program. The project was started in 2017 to block militant infiltration, smuggling, and other illegal crossings on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Under the military-led border management project, Islamabad has also upgraded several formal crossings with Afghanistan to further facilitate bilateral and transit trade activities.

In spite of the serious blames that Pakistan is not doing more against the infiltration of terrorists across the border, the Afghan government didn't welcome this Pakistani measure and called this fencing illegal. Kabul still unilaterally claims that a huge area inside Pakistan belongs to Afghanistan and presently occupied by Pakistan.

The Afghan Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs, in its official website, doesn't recognize the borders between Afghanistan as legal and calls it “Malicious Durand Line”. Another dilemma overshadowing Pak-Afghan Relations in all areas of mutual cooperation.

APTTA and India

In fact, after the partition of British India into two states of India and Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan never had good relations with Pakistan. The ethnocentric approach of the consecutive Kabul governments toward the Durand line and territorial claim over a vast area in Pakistan has been the main obstacle in building a good working relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. With the utopian vision of a greater Pashtunistan or Afghanistan, India was a better ally to rely on. India also did not mind it to be accommodated in Afghanistan, in the immediate neighborhood of its hostile neighbor Pakistan. But for Pakistan, the Indian presence on both Eastern and Western borders has always been a matter of concern.
In brief, this negative trend in low-level relations between the two neighbors dominates all areas from politics to economy.
For India, there are only two roads leading to Afghanistan and onward to the reasonably sized CARs market and access to their natural resources. The distance between Wagah (Indian Border) to Torkham is only 588.4 km and from there to the capital, Kabul is only 228.4 km. It means the total distance from the nearest Indian border to Kabul is 816.8 km. Considering the unfriendly relations with Pakistan, in particular, the long-lasting issue of Kashmir, it is almost impossible for India to access this route to Afghanistan without the solution of the key issues with Pakistan.
The other issue which is seriously disturbing India is the expanding project of “The One Belt One Road Initiative” led by China and its Southern extension, the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). The CPEC is not only an important part of the Chinese-led global economic project but also a game-changer in the region which enables China to access and dominate the maritime politics of the Indian Ocean. The total distance via land route between Gwadar, the main hub of the CPEC to the “Khunjarab”, the Chinese border is only 2757 km.
If India would search for another alternative route to reach Afghanistan and ultimately to CARs, it has only one option, that is Iran. The Iranian port of “Chabahar” is said to be the potential competitor of Gwadar and no doubt that it is also an important port strategically.
To bypass Pakistan, years before the APTTA is signed, India has started a key highway project of Zaranj-Dilaram Highway (Route 606). This 215km long highway connects Iran to the Kabul-Herat highway, the only and the key route of Afghanistan, connecting Herat to Kabul and onward to northern Afghanistan. This ambitious project was started in 2005 and completed in 2009. The highway is constructed by the Building and Road Organization of India (BRO) and it cost US$ 125 million.
On January 22, 2009, Hamid Karzai, the former Afghan President, and Pranab Mukherji, who was serving as the Indian FM at that time, participated in the inauguration ceremony of route 606. Both leaders, in their speeches, talked about the benefits of the project and its probable impact on the regional integration but some parts of both speeches were said to be provocative. Mukherji said, “The completion of the road reflects the determination of both India and Afghanistan that nothing can prevent or hinder collaboration between the two countries" and Karzai was two steps ahead, he said, “the completion of the project, which opens a shorter alternative route connecting Kabul to Iran, is a message to those who want to stop cooperation between India and Afghanistan. “Our cooperation will not stop .”
On May 23, 2016, India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed a trilateral transit trade deal in Tehran. This transit trade pact was inked in the presence of Narendra Modi, Hassan Rohani, and Ashraf Ghani, all three heads of states.
In the same visit, Indian PM announced that India would invest US$500 million to develop the strategically important Chabahar port, close to Iran's border with Pakistan, he said that the port would open a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia for Indian goods and products, avoiding the land route through Pakistan. The Iranian business daily, Ta'adol, also welcomed the deal. It said that India wants to challenge China's power in central and South Asia through Chabahar port. Noting that China is trying to control the pulse of regional trade by making extensive investments in the Pakistani port of Gwadar, India is now positioned against its strong competitor by investing in the port. The newspapers reminded its readers of ‘setbacks' that Iran has faced due to India, “We should raise our complaints… and ask them [India] to be more honest in their trade with Iran, and to fulfill their obligations more seriously,” Another Iranian daily E'temad added that Mr. Modi's visit and the signing of agreements on joint projects, energy and connectivity will ring danger bells in Islamabad, China, and Riyadh.
Indian newspapers called the deal a milestone and a strategic defeat of Pakistan as well as the potential to provide an Indian strategic counter to Pakistan's Gwadar port being developed by China right next door to Chabahar.

The Iranian daily's concerns came true when the U.S. President Donald Trump overturned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and imposed rigorous sanctions on Iran in 2018. India could not continue with Iran, the way Iran counted on it.
Iranian Foreign minister, Zawad Zarif conveyed to his Indian Counterpart that Iran had expected the Modi government to be ‘more resilient' in the face of Washington's bullying at a time when equally Modi government was dragging its feet on the Chabahar port project, which has far-reaching implications for regional connectivity, stability, and security. In fact, Zarif reflected the deep misgivings at the highest level of Iranian leadership that India's capacity or political will to pursue independent foreign policies are increasingly in doubt.
On the other hand, a partnership with the US to restrain China was also attractive for India. The table moved further around after the two-day visit of Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) in India on February 29, 2019. The visit was followed by a UD$ 100 billion Saudi investment in Indian in the areas of energy, refining, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture, minerals, and mining.
This strategic shift in both Indian and Saudi foreign policy was received with great concerns in all three relevant countries, Pakistan, Iran, and China.
As a logical percussion in August 2020, a piece of breaking news about the Chino-Iran mega-deal of US$ 400 billion through a strategic partnership, over the next 25 years rattled not only the Indian policymakers but also the western countries. Now, Iran did not need any more Indian investment in Chabahar port, the crucial railway line from Chabahar to Zahedan that ultimately connects the Iranian port to Zaranj nor the Iranian were eager for Indian money to explore the Farnaz B gas field. India started feeling to be footed out of the deal and the ambitious approach to access Afghanistan and the CARs. India wooed Iran to keep China away from Chabahar. Although Iran had a very diplomatic and soft response to India but a former Iranian diplomat, who served in India, said New Delhi's “growing ties” with the US and Israel under the Narendra Modi government have “not gone down well with Tehran. ” But it seems to be too late.

Another angle

Now, how the APPTA could be an important factor for both countries to preserve their geopolitical/economic importance and guarantee the prosperity of the people in both countries. Although, Pakistan continued to disallow the transit of Indian exports to Afghanistan via its land routes due to multidimensional political, security, legal and technical problems. But it allows exports of fresh fruits, vegetables, and herbs from Afghanistan to India through the Wagah land border. It means Afghanistan does not have any problem with its exports from Pakistan. Over and above to India and the rest of the world, Pakistan itself has been the favorite destiny of Afghanistan's fresh fruits and vegetables with minimal spoilage and without losing its natural taste and freshness. Fresh fruits and vegetables comprise a big percentage of the total Afghan export. According to the paper, AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY 2018-2022, FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES SECTOR published Afghan Ministry of Industry and Commerce, over 90% of Afghan fresh fruits and vegetables are consumed in Pakistan, US$ 71.5 million and it is predicted an increase of 45% in coming years. Moreover, there is a high demand for Afghan coal in Pakistan. Only one company ‘Fauji Cement Company ltd.' requires up to 324,000 metric tons of Afghan coal per annum.

Now, let us explore two more important issues related to APTTA.
1. The Chabahar Port indeed bypasses Pakistan and if the other issues did not overshadow the Indo-Iranian relations, as it is discussed earlier, India may have access to Afghanistan but the main destination of India is CARs and beyond that. Why India would use Afghanistan as a transit route while Iran has better infrastructure, better roads, railway lines, and better management bodies, as well as there, are no security threats, it operational in all seasons and the no hard terrain to cross. So, the importance of Afghanistan as a crossroad and a connecting hub will be badly affected which will have a long-run effect. India will certainly use the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). It is the ship, rail, and road route for moving freight between India, Russia, Iran, Europe, and Central Asia. The INSTC project was initiated by Russia, India, and Iran in September 2000 in St. Petersburg. The trilateral agreement was signed on May 16, 2002, at least one-half decades earlier than the India-Iran-Afghanistan trade transit agreement.

2. Another agreement ‘The Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA)' was signed by Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan on March 09, 1995, in Islamabad, 15 years earlier than the APTTA. Later on, in 2017 Tajikistan also wished to join this agreement while Kabul has reluctant to finalize a transit trade agreement with Islamabad. Tajikistan is poised to join a separate initiative that will connect Pakistan to Central Asia, bypassing Afghanistan entirely. The QTTA provides Pakistan an alternative gateway to Central Asia by completely circumnavigating Afghanistan. It would use the Karakoram Highway which connects Gilgit-Baltistan to China's Xinjiang region, which links to Central Asia. On May 08 2020, the Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister, Sardor Umurzakov also submitted a formal request. The road will provide Uzbekistan access to China and the Pakistani seaports. Now, this project is part of CPEC and is operational. This transit route is also bypassing Afghanistan. Although, the road passing from the tough mountainous areas and the traffic might face problems, it the same case with the Kabul-Mazar-e Sharif highway when it passes through Salang Mountains and Tunnel.

Concluding Remarks

1. All knows the undesirable fluctuating relationship between both neighbors but both have to overcome those problems as soon as possible; lest it will undermine all facets of relation from trade to peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

2. APTTA has more implications beyond mutual trade. If, Afghanistan cannot incorporate the region economically by this project; it should not lose Pakistan and CARs. If APTTA is not signed Afghanistan may lose its leverage as the crossroad of the region. The countries all around Afghanistan, which are much more stable economically and politically may find their way for mutual trade with or without Afghanistan. The two examples of INSTC and QTTA projects, respectively led by Russia and China are already discussed above.

3. No doubt that India is an important country in the region but the persistent pressure of Kabul to include India in the APTTA does not seem to be materializing. Since the mutual relations between Pakistan and India have their own dynamics and history, until they do not resolve their problems of considering each other an existential threat, APTTA has to move forward with or without India. India cannot export to Afghanistan via Wagah and Pakistan land route but the government of Pakistan has given Afghanistan a special dispensation to export Afghan Goods to India.

4. India has already found another trade route for its exports to Afghanistan and CARs., Afghanistan does not need to worry about that.

5. Although one can realize the immense pressure on president Ghani, Afghanistan really a hard land to rule with the history of the four-decade war. At present, the issues of his lavish dining table with fourteen various types of meet and the deadlock in Doha Talks might be matters of more importance but APTTA is also a matter that should be dealt with on a priority basis.

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FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES SECTOR
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How the Taliban Chose the Bullet Over the Ballot?

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2020-11-07T16:01:08Z

Abstract

Insofar as the Taliban leadership has a vision of the state, it embodies the centralism of the current Afghan state, but with supreme power dominated by the Taliban which is perhaps under the cover of a clerical council to select the national leader.
The Taliban vision of the state embodies a form of sectarian exclusiveness. They posit their movement as the guardian of self-interpreted Sunni Hanafi tradition and deny all other diverse people a place in the state.
And, in their struggle to capture and transform the state, the Taliban have explicitly rejected the ideas of pluralism and power-sharing. The Taliban have been explicit in their intention to rule alone, with no need to respect pluralism.
But, in pursuing these goals, the Taliban have prioritized the use of force and have refused to embrace constitutional politics. They have in effect chosen the path of the bullet over the ballot.
This hard-liner approach of Taliban also jeopardized the hope for a positive outcome from the peace talks in Doha.

Preface

So far, no substantial progress in Doha Intra-Afghan Talks can be observed after it began on September 12, 2020. Hitherto, there have been only ceremonial meetings with the formal pleasantry exchange of views, reiterating the will for the success of talks.
Keeping in view the complex nature of the problem, no one expected quick results but indeed, it is disappointing that the negotiating team of the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirates, the Taliban and the Republican delegates from Kabul could not yet finalize the procedural rules and agendas of the talks. One can truly realize the difficulties ahead. The crucial issues like the probable future contour of the polity, governance, Shariah and civic values are on pending as the real bones of contention.
On the other hand, the recent wave of high level of widespread violence has also negatively impacted bilateral peace agreement between the Taliban and the US, signed on February 29, 2020.
October 2020 was one of the bloodiest months. In Helmand, dozens from both sides including many civilians lost their lives and much more injured as well as thousands of families were displaced internally. The US Air Force bombarded Taliban to stop their advance toward the Lashkar Gah – the provincial capital. Taliban raised its serious objection against the US action in favor of Kabul government and called it a serious violation of the bilateral agreement while the US rejected the claim and warned the Taliban to honestly bind to the agreement regarding the reduction in violence. Instead of heeding the US envoy, from Helmand the Taliban marched on to Kandahar.
On October 18, 2020, a car bomb attack on the police headquarter in Firozkoh, capital of Ghor, killed 18 and more than 150 were wounded. Most of the casualties were civilians – the women, children and students from the deaf and dumb education center nearby.
On October 24, 2020, an education center in Western Kabul was targeted that killed dozens of children while over 150 were wounded. Although, Daesh (ISIS-K) claimed the responsibility, the civil society, political parties and Afghan government have raised their finger towards Taliban.
On November 02, 2020, again Kabul University was attacked in which, according to health officials, 19 people, including students and a teacher, were killed and 22 others were injured. Again, Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack. According to Ministry of Interior official, the attack on Kabul University ended after six hours after killing three attackers.

Hurdles so far

The issue of recognition of the Shi'ite religion for its followers which comprise around 20% of the whole population of Afghanistan and forms the legal basis of the ongoing talks have been the main areas of dispute.
The Taliban insist that the guiding principles of the ongoing talks should be based on the bilateral agreement between the Taliban and the US signed on February 29, 2020. In which four important issues were agreed upon, the withdrawal of US troops, counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and the Taliban, a reduction in violence and ultimately a ceasefire, and the initiation of the intra-Afghan negotiations. Kabul's delegation insists that the US-Afghan joint declaration signed on the same day should also be recognized. Taliban are reluctant to agree to any document that recognizes Kabul administration as legitimate.
The Republican Team from Kabul raises the point that how could it be possible to accept a bilateral agreement as the guiding principle in which they were not involved. To some extent, their claim seems to be logical as they were bypassed in the agreement by their main supporter – the US.
In addition, there seems to be a wide gap between the approaches of both sides with regards to the various terminologies which have deep political and religious meanings. Like “Jihad or conflict” or “Social Justice or Islamic Justice”, Taliban believe that their armed struggle has been a justified “Jihad” on the path of God while delegates from Kabul deny this claim and call it a “conflict”.
The delegates from Kabul stress that the future political system should be based on “Social Justice” while Taliban call it a western term and insist that it should be replaced with the Islamic term “Islamic Justice”.
Like many Afghans, the US is also frustrated with this stalemate since it is also eagerly waiting for a fruitful ending of this talks, probably for certain reasons. After weeks of deadlock, the two sides were reported to have accepted a role for the Qatari government as facilitator, assisted by diplomats of the other countries present at the talks. Although, the Taliban promptly distanced themselves from this.
Some of the delegates suggest that the problematic issues should not be discussed at the beginning, rather should be left for later but again the remaining issues regarding the ceasefire or so-called reduction in violence could be more stupefacient. It has proved to be the main card used as an effective tool by the Taliban over the last two decades. On this issue again, Taliban are not ready to simply relinquish their main leverage on just a good faith. And the most importantly, the Taliban's unclear stand on the probable future contour of the polity is still on pending to discuss. There are so many other issues with the controversial technical, ideological and political aspects on this difficult path to bring Taliban into the main stream politics under the single roof with all other diverse groups with different political and ideological point of view.
The fact remains that the Taliban have so far confined themselves only to the vague terminologies like Islamic System, Islamic Justice or Islamic Shariah.
Although Taliban are not showing their cards, one can foretell the probable silhouette of the future political system. But what exactly? Do they have any model from the present-day Islamic countries or from the past?
In negotiations, Taliban have avoided laying out their preferred system of Islamic government. However, previous Taliban stances and other historic and contemporary cases of Islamic government provide clues as to what model the Taliban are likely to push for.

Is there any ideal model of polity in the Islamic history?

The rhetoric of Islamic form of government has been heard from many Islamic parties throughout the Islamic world but many political scientists believe that political systems and good governance have its own internationally recognized definitions and benchmarks, it has nothing to do with religion.
Great Islamic scholar, author as well as a known politician of the subcontinent Molauna Abul Ala Moudoodi (1903-1979) believes that with the end of Rashidun Khilafat on 29 January 661 with the martyrdom of Hazrat Ali, Islamic rule officially converted from Khilafat to Mulookiyat means “Kingship” (mulk instead of truly khilafa)).
In this regard, it is to be mentioned that the Umayyad caliphs referred to themselves not as khalifat Rasul Allah (“successor of the messenger of God,” the title preferred by the tradition), but rather as khalifat Allah (“deputy of God”). Thus, the alien concept of hereditary succession introduced against the earlier tradition. According to Moulana's thesis, this deviation from the basic teaching has brought about negative impact in the Islamic world and divided the elite in two classes: first, the ruling class and second, the people who were supposed to be the religious class.
The known Islamic scholar and author of many books in Kabul, Ali Amiri believes that “Quran and Sunna” do not recommend any specific political system and mode of governance, rather stand on certain values which promote social justice, equality and harmony in human societies. He says that democracy is not in contradiction with the basic guidelines of Islam and political systems should be based on the economic, political and other ground realities as the institutional guarantee for peace, harmony, stability and prosperity. According to his views, Islam does not oppose if Islamic societies get the best advantages of the human experiences in the fields of politics and governance.
The historical Islamic Empires were almost autocratic, Absolute Monarchies, Unitary in Nature and dominated by clan Aristocracy. The Shriah Law was nothing but an instrument to justify the kingships. (See Appendix 1)
The Mongol invasions that began in the 13th century drastically reconfigured the Islamic world. The invasions brought about the end of Arab Empire and the beginning of Turkic dynasties. The drastic change in the ruling class also did not change anything in governance qualitatively.

What about the present-day Islamic countries?

Expect for that of few, most of the Islamic countries have the modern constitutionalism. The “Shariah” plays a nominal role mixed with the European style Common Law as the base of their legal system. In most of these countries, the Shariah and modern concept of legal system are not intertwined through clear boundaries. But still their political systems are well-defined internationally. (See Appendix 2)
The concept of absolute monarchies has already lost its popularity worldwide including the Islamic World. Moreover, autocratic and aristocratic governments are disliked overwhelmingly among the Muslim population across the world.
Here is the real dilemma! Nor the Taliban ever indicated any Islamic country as their role model neither themselves presented a clear idea of statehood. In this regard, their concept seems to be under developed. But for sure, the Islamic countries with multiparty democracies, modern political systems or major portion of their judiciary depend on western civil laws cannot be acceptable for the Taliban.
Some aspects of the unique political systems of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran might be convincing for Taliban where Ulema have protagonist characters in politics and the judiciary has active role in the Islamization of legal system. Both Islamic countries have their own distinctive features in their political systems. It will be discussed in brief later on.

What are Taliban afraid of?

In Doha, the Kabul delegation has clear stance on the certain issues like, the political system, governance, democracy, elections, human and women rights, religious minorities, ethnic, lingual and cultural diversities and support for the enacted constitution which is mostly in accordance with the international conventions.
On the contrary, the Taliban do not seem to be vocal on these issues. Without going into the detail, all of their officials and spokespersons present Islam as the remedy of all odds. As well as, Taliban are trying to convince the relevant stakeholders that they are not the ones of 90s and they have a deep realization of changing world of 21st century with regards to the undeniable universal values.
Why do the Taliban speak on certain vital issues in vague terms? The probable reasons could be;
1. They do not want to be seen as an incompatible factor with the ground realities and some undeniable values, no one dares to comprise on, internationally. With countless efforts and graceful dealing of the Trump Administration through its envoy Khalilzad, Taliban are no more a terrorist group or rebels. Taliban do not want to remain as a blacklisted organization rather want to be recognized as a political entity. Taliban realize that tough stand on certain issues might change the views of the international backers of Afghanistan and they might turn their back once again. The strict Sharia law without accepting certain international benchmarks of governance, might not be acceptable for the involved domestic and international stakeholders. The Taliban have traveled a long way from being a top terrorist group to be recognized as an acceptable and negotiable political entity. Here comes the main dilemma that they cannot distance themselves from bullet and not in a position to deny the ballot, means the civic values and the popular pluralism.
2. If they would enter into procedural and institutional debates, they might lose control over their foot soldiers who are unfamiliar with such process and might revolt against their negotiators in Doha for closing an unholy deal with the people whom they never considered as good Muslims. The institutionalized terminologies for them are still “Amir-ul- Mominin” (The lord of the faithful), Sharia, Islamic System, Ulema (clergies), Jihad and mostly used terms for their opponents have been Kafars (infidels) or puppets/facilitators of occupying forces, the forces of evil and corruption (Shar-o-Fisad) etc. The common terms with the pre and postfix of “Islamic” has been a good mean to skip the complicated issues of modern governance.
3. Regardless of the strict religious approach, another important reason of Taliban's reluctance to accept the popular democracy is their understanding of the ground reality. They might be a military force with thousands of fighters but do not have a reliable vote bank. They might lose ballots miserably. Without the support of sword and terror, they might be lost with in a brief time.
4. The last but not the least, the Taliban realize that its fighters cannot be integrated in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), trained by the NATO and its partners. The foot soldiers of Taliban and their local commanders resemble medieval ill-organized crusaders and cannot be accommodated in the modern army. Their union could disintegrate one or both of them. In that case, the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirate might be the probable loser.
It is also to be mentioned here that the present form of political system of Afghanistan is not suitable for the deeply diverse Afghan social fabric. As well as domestically and internationally many institutions call the current system as dysfunctional. Even though, the notion of sword and blood of Taliban have been repulsive for the majority who believe in a sustainable peace with the accommodation of all sections of Afghan society in the system.

The probable dream of Taliban

Until now, the Taliban have denied any possibility of coalition set up with the current Kabul administration. It would negate all their earlier narratives based on self-defined Sharia by which they have mobilized thousands.
It seems that the Taliban want to build an ill-defined political system not as the continuation or by the reform of the current one, established with the wholehearted assistance of the International community and the longest engagement that has costed over a trillion USD.
One can easily make out what could be a favorable future scenario for the Taliban.
To prove that they were on the right side of the history with a just stance, it would be desirable scenario that they would emerge as victorious at the end of the day. They would certainly re-impose the misleading narrative that Afghans are impregnable and they have defeated the largest military power of the world.
On the contrary, Afghanistan has been a recognized serious challenge for the civilization and the US was never engaged in a fight with the intent to eliminate Taliban. It is also to be admitted that the consecutive Afghan governments have never been good partners with the US in this regard.

The probable model for Taliban

Among the Islamic Countries, there are only two, who claim to be pure Islamic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some aspects of the political system of both these two countries might be striking for Taliban.

Saudi Model – The political system of KSA is based on absolute monarchy that was developed upon the system of belief of the Islam guided by, the descendants of “Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the founder of the “Wahabi School of Thought”. In fact, the Saudi political system is also unique in its nature. Two families the “House of Saud” and the “House of Al Sheikh” who have 300 years old agreement to support each other. According to the agreement which was sealed between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744, both Mohammads agreed that “Ibne Saud” will be the “Imam”, means political leader of the Muslims and “Ibne Wahab” will be the leader of the religious affairs. Thus the political and the religious establishments were divided between the two “Houses” respectively.
In brief, KSA has autocratic, clan aristocratic and bloodline hereditary system both politically and religiously. The King serves the two designations of the head of the state as well as the head of the government. KSA doesn't have elected parliament rather just a handpicked advisory council without the right of the primary legislation. Elections for local bodies are permitted in 2005 but women were given the right to vote only in 2015. To be brief, nor is the head of state elected neither the so-called parliament. Meanwhile, the religious leadership (Grand Mufti) is also hereditary. Economy is pumped by the oil and Sharia has been an instrument for the legitimacy of the kingdom.

Diagram- Political Power Structure of the KSA

Source: hierarchystructure.com

Iranian Model – Except for that of domination of Shiite Jurisprudent, Iranian political system might be much closer to the Taliban's idea as compare to the Saudi model.
“Iran's constitution establishes the nation as both a democracy and a theocracy, blending the liberal notion of popular sovereignty with oversight by the Guardian Council to ensure political candidates, laws and regulations adhere to Islamic practices.”
In Iran, there are multiple layers of power, but the real power lies in the hand of supreme leader. This highest post is reserved only for the top theologist with the authority of ruling (fatwa) in various fields of Islamic law (Fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence) (Article 109, Constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran).
The Guardian Council is a twelve-member body composed of six qualified Ulema nominated by the supreme leader and next half comprised specialists from different fields, are nominated by the head of the judiciary who are subjected to the approval of parliament (Article 91). On the other hand, the head of the judiciary is appointed by the supreme leader (Article 110/6-b). It means that in the appointed of Guardian Council member the Supreme Leader has a superior role.
This council is so powerful that without it, the elected parliament (Majlis) doesn't have any status (Article 93), it has the right to interpret the constitution (Article 98) and the power of veto against any bill which it considers not compatible with the Islamic Laws (Articles 94, 95 and 96).
The council organizes as well as supervise all the major elections for the president, Council of Experts of the leadership (That elect and dismiss the supreme leader), parliament and referendum (Article 99).
The Council of (Islamic) Expert of the leadership (Khibragan) is another powerful body that is composed of only high ranked religious scholars (Ulema) whose qualifications are also verified either by the Guardian Council or the Supreme leader himself. (Article 2- Electoral Law of the Council of Expert). In addition to that Guardian Council can vet/disqualify any candidate wants to contest the presidential or parliamentary elections or Council of (Islamic) Experts.
The next council is Expediency Discernment Council of the system composed of 39 handpicks of the Supreme Leader. It comprises again mostly the ulema but also technocrats loyal to the system. It is an advisory council to the Supreme Leader as well as the body resolves the conflict between the main bodies of the states (Article 12). The Supreme Leader may delegate some of his power to this council, if required.
Supreme Leader has the full control of the armed forces including 190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The total size of Iranian armed forces with reserve units are estimated to be around 1, 060,000.

Diagram- The Power Structure of the Iranian Political System

Source: BBC

The Iranian Political System could be called a pure “Theocracy” with a democratic touch by a controlled electoral system.
Since, the Taliban now realize the importance of international donor as the lifeline for the crippled and donor dependent Afghan economy, they can't ignore some aspects of the predominant international benchmarks of the governance. They might agree to some sort of plural democracy with controlled local elections. On the other hand, the western world also does not expect from Taliban a political system and the governance that fit into their criteria. For the international mission, the honorable withdrawal is priority, they might agree to minimum standards of governance and probably would ignore human rights violations and other civic values like they are doing it in many Arab absolute monarchies.
The power structure of Iranian polity might be noteworthy for the Taliban but they lack an important aspect of an ideal theocracy. The theological foundation of Iran is not mixed with the tribalism. In spite of the fact that the “Fars” are 67-70% of the whole population, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, the longest serving head of state in the Middle East, belongs to the Azari ethnic group which comprise around 16% of the Iranian population. In addition to that, 11 members of Council of (Islamic) experts are Azaris. Ali Meshkini another Azari, from 1983 till his death in 2007 was the chairman of this council. There are 44 (of 290 in total) are representative of Azerbaijan region in the Iranian Parliament. The Grand Ayatullah Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, ex-Prime Ministers, Mehdi Bazargan and Mir-Hossein Mousavi were also Azaris while Mehdi Karrubi the prominent opposition figure and ex-Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and the ex-Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezaee belong to Lor, ethnic group of Loristan. The powerful Larijani brothers are “Mazanis” from Mazendran.
The Sunni population of Iran, mostly the followers of the “Hanafi School of Thought” have been demanding for more representation in the executive posts. According to the CIA Factbook, their population is 5-10% of the total population.
On the contrary, the Sunnis of Afghanistan, most of them are followers of the same school of thought but from other ethnic, lingual and cultural groups have been resisting against the Taliban because of its deeply rooted tribal approach. Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban are seen as the symbol of backwardness rather than a religious group. The majority including the moderate Pashtuns don't agree with the version of Shariah of Taliban, badly mixed with the tribalism.
In Iran, there might be supremacy of Shiite jurisprudence but it recognizes not only all other Muslim school of thoughts but also non-Muslim like Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian have their own family laws (Article 11, 12 and 13 of Iranian Constitution), same as it is written in Afghan article 131 of enacted Afghan Constitution. In this regard too Taliban seem to be very rigid, the level of intolerance in their lines are witnessed to be higher than the general expectations.

Are these models applicable in Afghanistan of 21st century?

There is no doubt that like many Islamic countries, religion has been playing an important role in Afghan politics too but only the sacralization of politics by religious rhetoric cannot bring sustainable peace and ultimate stability. Rather, there is a desperate need of a system for the just allocation of power vertically and horizontally suitable for the deeply diverse country.
The models of Iran and KSA cannot be copied in Afghanistan. It will convert Afghanistan in an abandoned island, the region and the world community need an Afghanistan compatible with the rules of the game.
Afghanistan needs a viable political system which could promote harmony by its nature. Only a modern and recognized political system with good governance can save Afghanistan from another chaos in the decades ahead.
Afghanistan does not have unlimited time for getting through this havoc. It should get the best advantage of the world attention paid to it. Still, the international community did not disengage from Afghanistan completely. The regional countries have been showing positive signs to help Afghan settlement unanimously. But the continuous reluctance to tolerate each other institutionally through a workable prescription on relative modern lines might make all to leave Afghanistan alone.
No one can contest the view that current dysfunctional political system of Afghanistan needs an overhauling but it should be a step ahead. It cannot afford to once again experience the same model of governance that could not settle the internal sources of crises.

Appendix 1

Appendix 2 NOTES

Moudoodi, Molauna Abul Ala. Khilafat wa Malookiyat (in Urdu). Lahore: Idarat-ul-Tarjuman Quran, 1996.

Amiri, Ali. "Islam and the State (in Farsi)." The Daily Ittelaat Roz. October 12, 2020.
https://www.etilaatroz.com/108480/islam-and-republic-1/

“Terrorist Acts by Groups from 2013 to 2017.” Countrydata.info. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.laenderdaten.info/terrorismus/terrorgruppen.php

Al-Rasheed, Madawi – A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. London: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

“Saudi Arabia Political Hierarchy.” Hierarchy Structure. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.hierarchystructure.com/saudi-arabia-political-hierarchy/

Alem, Yasmin. Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System. Washington D.C: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2011.

“Iran Military Power.” Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). August 2019. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf.

“Iran Who Holds the Power.” BBC online. Accessed November 5, 2020. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/supreme_leader.stm

“The Umayyad and Abbasid Empires.” Lumen Learning. Accessed November 5, 2020
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/the-umayyad-and-abbasid-empires/

“Spain.” New World Encyclopedia. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Spain #Muslim_conquest

Shuriye, Abdi O. “Explorations on the Abbasids Political Culture in Pursuit of Sustainable System of Governance in the Muslim World.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 7, no.4 (2006): 235.

Grigoriadis, Theocharis N. “Compromising Islam with Empire: Bureaucracy and Class in Safavid Iran.” Iran & the Caucasus 17, no. 4 (2020): 371-382.

Maheshwari, Dr. V.K. “Aurangzeb – The Man Responsible for the Decline of Mughal Empire in India.” Word Press (blog). September 1, 2015. http://www.vkmaheshwari.com/WP/?p=2026

Hupchick, Dennis P. The “Ottoman System”. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

“Population of Indonesia by Province 1971, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2010.” Central Bureau of Statistics.
Accessed November 5, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20171123162558/http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1267

“Population Census 2017.” Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Accessed November 5, 2020. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/provisional-summary-results-6th-population-and-housing-census-2017-0

“The Results of Address-based Population Registration System.” Turkish Statistical Institute. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://data.tuik.gov.tr/en/display-bulletin/?bulletin=the-results-of-address-based-population-registration-system-2019-33705

“General Population Census 2016.” Statistical Center of Iran. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.amar.org.ir/english

Buchta, Wilfried. “Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic.” The Washington Institute. January 2000. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-rules-iran-the-structure-of-power-in-the-islamic-republic

“The Total Population in 2018.” General Authority for Statics: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20190403082640/https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/indicators/1

“2010 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia.” Department of Statistics, Malaysia. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=117&bul_id=MDMxdHZjWTk1SjFzTzNkRXYzcVZjdz09&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09#:~:text=The%202010%20Population%20and%20Housing,formation%20of%20Malaysia%20in%201963.&text=Census%202010%20revealed%20that%20the,in%202000%20(Chart%201).

“UAE Population 2017.” The Statistical Centre for the Cooperation Council for the Arab Countries of the Gulf (“GCC-Stat”). Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.gccstat.org/en/country-profile/ae

“The World Factbook: Middle East: United Arab Emirates.” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 5, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html

#KabulProtest was historic. Now, it's for the govt to take on Taliban, IS

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2015-11-14T23:40:47Z

When the Taliban were toppled in 2001, Afghanistan began to dream of a free, peaceful, stable, democratic country. Fourteen years on, for a host of reasons, that dream has soured.

The Taliban are back, more brutal than ever, and the new terrorist network of IS has reared its head. Their atrocities are growing ever more horrifying by the day. Made desperate, the Afghans are fleeing in their thousands to seek shelter, and hopefully a better life, abroad.

Of late, the terrorists have shown such barbarity that the country's murderous civil wars of the last century seem almost civilised. Then, at least, the warring factions would abide by some tribal rules of war. Today's terrorists have no such qualms.

They are murdering innocent Afghans for no other reason than their ethnic, lingual and political affiliations. In just three days after capturing Kunduz on 28 September, the Taliban fighters killed hundreds of people, including women and children, and reportedly raped women belonging to non-Pashtun tribes.

The latest atrocity was committed last week. It was so heart-wrenching that hundreds of women took to the streets of Kabul in protest.

The terrorists executed a family of seven they had kidnapped five months ago — four men, two women and girl all of nine years. Her name was Shukria Tabassum.

Initially, the killings were blamed on the IS but it later emerged that a Taliban group led Mullah Dadullah Mansour was also involved. The family was from Ghazni's Jaghuri district, which is inhabited by ethnic Hazaras and is known for its high literacy rate.

The terrorists have been frequently kidnapping, and killing, ordinary people, mostly Hazaras, traveling across the country over the past few years.

When the throat-slit bodies were handed over to the villagers, they were outraged. They refused to bury the bodies, and thousands of them marched towards Kabul, carrying the slain family's coffins on their shoulders.

By the time they arrived in the western district of Kabul, which is home to a large Hazara population, on 10 November, the march had swelled many times over.

On 11 November, Kabul witnessed a historic march of tens of thousands of people, including a large number of women, towards the Presidential Palace.

The protesters raged against the regime of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah for failing to curb the Taliban and IS violence and providing security to citizens.

The Presidential Palace guards, who had never witnessed such a massive protest, opened fire and injured eight people. Yet, the protestors stood firm, leaving only around midnight after after an assurance from the government that their demands will the considered.

Complex web of terror
Immediately after the tragedy came to light, Afghan officials had blamed Pakistan's ISI. Mullah Dadullah belongs to the breakaway Taliban faction of Mullah Mohammad Rasool, a rival of the main faction led by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.

Rasool's faction recently accused Mansour of being an ISI stooge who didn't represent the real followers of the late Mullah Omar. Indeed, they went so far as to accuse Mansour of murdering Omar.

The IS fighters in the country have declared their loyalty to Rasool, thus pitting them against the official Taliban. If that wasn't complicated enough, Rasool's group has declared its willingness to talk to the Afghan state.

How can Afghanistan pull out of this morass of terror and barbarity? Perhaps, the country's government can start by asking itself the following questions.

The various factions of Taliban, in spite of their differences, subscribe to the same ideology of terror. Can the country really hope for peace from any of them?

Most of the current leaders, including those from the erstwhile Northern Alliance, are losing their support bases due to their perceived ambiguity and hypocrisy. Can they recover the lost trust, and how?

Does the country have credible next generation leaders? And what is their vision?

How long can the Ghani-Abdullah regime survive the crisis brought on by the Taliban onslaught and the growing public anger?

Will the growing violence and this government's failure to curb it force the international players, particularly the US, to rethink their Afghan strategy?

Kabul: Protest against Hazara Genocide in Afghanistan11/11/2015Photo by: Jawad Hamdard Kia#IAmHazara...

Posted by Kabul Press on Thursday, November 12, 2015

Mullah Omar's death might be bad news for Afghanistan

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2015-08-02T09:44:09Z

The death
• This is the third time in five years that there has been news of Mullah Omar's death
• This time the Taliban have confirmed the news. Some of them have declared Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor as the successor to Mullah Omar, precipitating a leadership crisis and intense factional politics in the movement.
• The acceptance of Mullah Omar's death will have a significant impact on Afghanistan and the region as a whole
The timing
• This comes at a time when the Afghanistan government is in the process of negotiating with the Taliban
• The Islamic State, earlier known as ISIS, is also on the rise in Afghanistan
The impact
• Mullah Omar was a unifying factor for Taliban. If he is dead, it could break into factions, competing to prove which is more hard line
• IS could also end up absorbing Taliban militants
• Negotiations will become even more difficult with multiple factions to deal with and perhaps the main Taliban faction opposed to real negotiations

Mullah Omar is dead, once again. This is probably the third time in the last 5 years that news of the Taliban supremo's death surfaced in the media. Taliban in Quetta moved with remarkable speed to announce that they had appointed a successor, before most members of the movement had even absorbed the news of Omar's death.
Senior members of the movement, including Hassan Rahmani and Mohamamd Rasool have gone public in denouncing the elevation of Mansoor to the position of Ameer. It is now out in the open. There is a power struggle in the Taliban.
However, no one, including his close comrades, had seen Omar after the collapse of the notorious Taliban regime in December 2001.
This news comes at a time when the second round peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban were about to begin. They have promptly been postponed sine diem.
On the other hand, the insurgency in Afghanistan has entered a critical and violent phase, especially with the Taliban losing ground to fighters loyal to the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS and ISIL).
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have never been under such military pressure in the last 14 years. The southern and northern provinces are under serious threat from IS-led terrorist groups, which are waving their black flags in the areas that lie beyond the government's writ.
Given this context, what will be the impact of Mullah Omar;s death?
Impact on peace talks
The Taliban had always been reluctant to talk to the regime in Kabul, calling it a western puppet created by the US to undermine Islamic values. But after the end of the international military mission in December 2014, the buzz about a negotiation gained momentum.
A major question for Kabul was whom it should talk to. There have been many Taliban groups fighting in various parts of Afghanistan having no coordination with each other. But even then, all the groups broadly accepted Mullah Omar's leadership.
His name at least had a symbolic importance which helped keep the Taliban united. He wasn't just a mere commander leading a campaign against Kabul, but the Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful).
What will be the political and military impact on the Taliban of the loss of Omar? Will they be able to participate in the peace talks with the necessary legitimacy? Will the Qatar group side with the newly proclaimed Ameer or will it too be split among the rival claimants? What is in the deal between the Haqani group and the Kandaharis which has seen Seraj Haqani declared deputy of the movement? Is this a pro-negotiations deal or an anti-negotiations deal?
On its part, will Kabul be confident enough to continue with result-oriented negotiations? And if, after the talks, the National Unity government of Afghanistan has to share power, which faction of the Taliban will be part of it?
It is because of these questions that many feel the news of Omar's death will have a negative impact on the peace talks. Some in the Afghan regime even say that it could be a trick to sabotage the negotiations.
Will Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, newly proclaimed Ameer, be able to stamp his authority on the movement or will he face an open revolt?
Kabul will soon have to decide whether it is worth spending time and money on the dialogue or if it is better off focusing its energies on the battlefield.
Impact on the battlefield
Districts in the north are falling to the insurgents one after the other. Although, the ANSF has been able to recover some ground, the overall scenario shows that the Ashraf Ghani administration may be vulnerable.
Mullah Omar's death may end up creating space for the IS. Many Taliban militants may get absorbed into it
The defection of 200 soldiers from Afghan National Police in Northeastern Badakhshan this week is an alarming sign. It shows that even soldiers are beginning to lose faith in Kabul. Analysts and even some politicians believe that the unexpected growth of IS in Northern Afghanistan is a bigger threat than Taliban. Far from a localised phenomenon, it seems to be a project to destabilise the whole region from Middle East to Central Asia and even beyond.
The fighters in the north have ambitions of crossing the border into the Central Asian republics. In northern Afghanistan, Taliban is subordinate to the IS. Omar's demise will provide a further boost to the IS in Afghanistan. Many Taliban militants might even get absorbed into the IS.
In Ghazni and Zabul provinces one hardly sees the Taliban's white flag. It has already been replaced by the black flags of IS, even before the news of Omar's death.
A number of experts believed that Taliban and IS can't go together because of structural and geographical differences. Some also said that Afghans will never accept the supremacy of foreigners. However, this seems an outdated belief rather than a fact on the ground

Conclusion
The news of Mullah Omar's death isn't necessarily positive for Afghans. Jihadi politics will determine whether the eventual outcome is positive or negative. If Taliban fighters especially in the North, defect to the Islamic State and intensify their jihad, this will further undermine Afghanistan's security. If the faction which seems to have grabbed power in the Taliban movement pursues an even more hard line policy, opposing meaningful peace talks, that too will be a bad outcome for Afghanistan. But perhaps the worst outcome for Afghanistan would be if the break down in Taliban unity meant that one part of the movement kept the Afghan government busy in peace talks, while other Taliban factions try to outdo each other in intensifying the conflict. Tough times are ahead for Afghanistan and the Unity Government needs to strengthen the understanding between its component parts to be ready to face the violence and tricky politics we can expect from the heirs to Mullah Omar.

Dr. Hussain Yasa is the Chief Editor of the English daily Outlook Afghanistan, published from Kabul. He can be reached at dr.yasa1967@gmail.com

A concocted mandate

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2014-07-10T11:25:44Z

The provisional results which the Afghan Election Commission announced for the presidential election run-off are so implausible that any attempt to make them stick will undermine the political system which the world has worked hard to build up in Afghanistan over the past decade. The Commission claims a turn-out of 7.9 million voters, up 20% on the April turn-out. In Kabul, observers and candidate agents where able to watch polling day and reported fewer voters at polling stations than in April. But the Commission now reports a 12% increase in turn out. But in the insecure provinces of Paktika and Khost, where observers and monitors could not reach the polling stations, the Commission asks us to believe that turn-out rose by 254% and 123% respectively – nothing short of a miracle, in terms of electoral politics, especially as claimed turn-out in the South East is now close to estimated total population. Irrespective of who is supposed to have won, these turn-out figures are ludicrous and completely out of touch with Afghan reality. Announcing them was an act of shamelessness. Anyone trying to give a mandate to any candidate based upon such fabricated figures will be complicit in blatant rigging and political vandalism.

Afghanistan has reached this point because for ten year those who were meant to help Afghanistan build democracy kept quiet as our rulers perfected the mechanisms for rigging in successive elections. Systematic rigging in both the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections set dangerous precedents for the 2014 poll. However what has happened this time round is both more brazen than what Afghans have previously witnessed and more damaging for the future of the country.

Hamid Karzai was already an incumbent at the time of the 2004 election. He relied on inflated figures from refugee voting in Pakistan to scrape over the 50% mark and achieve a first round victory. The US-led international community has heavily involved in running this election but was also heavily invested in Karzai and so kept quiet about his first experience of rigging. Instead they hailed this rigged election as the first successful democratic practice in the history of Afghanistan and merely noted that a few flaws could be expected first time round. Ordinary Afghans kept quiet as they hoped that an international backed leader might make their lives better.

2009 was supposed to be the first Afghan-owned election as Karzai got to pick the Election Commission. They rigged this 2009 with the help of an army of ghost voters in the south eastern provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika. The 2009 Election Complaints Commission included a few non-Karzai appointees, who created problems by exposing the mass ballot-stuffing, which denied Karzai first round victory. The US stepped in to sort out the mess and dispatched John Kerry to cut a deal which saw Karzai deemed re-elected, without ever crossing the 50% mark, an outcome which was expedient rather than constitutional.

The main lesson which Karzai and his allies learned from 2009 was that they should never to leave things to chance. More dangerously, Karzai has accumulated an inner circle of advisers who practice ethnic politics and are determined to use the presidential palace's control over the electoral machinery to preserve what they consider to be the Pashtun divine right to rule over Afghanistan. This clique is prepared to gamble with the fate of the country in their willingness to manipulate the provincial administrations, the security forces and the electoral machinery to trump democratic politics.

Afghanistan has had access to the resources required to build an election apparatus according to normal democratic standards. But the clique around Karzai and more generally those who believed in the idea of preserving tribal privilege through capturing state power, by all means, resisted attempts to reform the electoral process. This time round the priority for this clique was to rig their way to ensuring that the successor to Karzai should be a Pashtun.

There have already been strong reactions from Afghanistan. But the Pashtun ruling elite and the departing international community probably do not yet realize the grave consequences of such a big gamble. The team of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah has revealed damning evidence of the systematic rigging, not least the phone recordings of Chief Electoral Officer Amerkhel instructing staff to rig in such a way that they side-stepped audit procedures. Amerkhel fled the country, only to be dragged back by his masters. Observer missions, by now concerned by the way the process has been handled, have published calls for large scale vote audit. If anyone was in doubt as to whether rigging took place, they only had to listen to IEC Chair, Nooristani, in a 3 July interview with Tulo News, in which he complained about his Electoral Officer and admitted concerns over ridiculously high turn-outs, ballot stuffing. You only have to look at the clips on social media to work out how the stuffing was done. There should be no surprise that in such circumstances candidate Abdullah has let it be known that he will not accept a result cobbled together from these results.

Nooristani, the IEC chief, the EU observers, consecutive US delegation and commentators started talking about a political solution to this deadlock. If vote-counting or the law and constitution cannot solve the crisis, what might an extra-constitutional settlement look like? This is the point where almost parties have to stop and think again and again. The probable solutions could be,

1. Re-elections- The opposition has already asked for re-elections in many provinces under stricter observation. But neither is there a will in the ruling circle to take this option seriously nor would this help to change the outcome. The reality, which people were reluctant to grasp before the election, is that while the insurgency is under way, properly observed free and fair elections are impossible in Pashtun rural areas.

2. Dr. Ghani Led Coalition- It would be difficult for Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to be the part of the government led by Dr. Ghani since he has already declared that he has no desire to go for a coalition with a team involved in stealing the mandate of the people. On the other hand Dr. Ghani, now that he is confident of victory, has already started to flex his muscle and show off as a resolute leader who does not need to consult. His closest partners have already started to question their future role in working with Dr. Ghani.

3. Dr. Abdulah Led Coalition- this is out of the question for the ruling elite since their whole gamble in rigging the election was to keep Dr. Abdullah away from power. The Pashtun ruling elite takes it as a matter of shame to hand over power back to the North. If, the incumbent president equated the shame of signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to the historical shame of the agreements of Durand and Gandomak, how could he simply hand over the Presidential Palace to a man who symbolized the end of two hundred and fifty years of Pashtun hegemony?

4. Third Option- Many believe that the end of Karzai's tenure and the deadlock of the Presidential Polls leaves no option but a transitional setup for a specific period to address the flaws not only in both the electoral process and the constitution itself. According to this idea the power structure should be modeled to reflect the ground realities of Afghanistan. This suggestion does not have any constitutional basis. But proponents invoke a doctrine of necessity and argue that the constitution now is inadequate relative to the requirements of a highly diverse country like Afghanistan. This option seems to be attractive but leaves unsettled the main question of who should lead the country. There will be a long line of the candidates and many countries will again start lobbying for their candidate of choice.

5. The Old Option- Others concerned that the electoral deadlock might lead to irreversible damage to the country think that the incumbent president should continue for some time but under a strictly controlled agenda. He could lead a coalition government of Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah for at least two years. The presence of two strong teams under the transitional leadership of president Karzai could lead Afghanistan in this critical period of transformation. The supporters of this theory believe that Karzai might be acceptable to both of the candidates since both of them worked under him for years and they are unlikely to find any other acceptable man to lead Afghanistan at such a time. Karzai under a charter accepted by both of the opponents could immediately start reforms in the electoral system and constitution and in 2016 there should be another more authentic and recognized election. But like the aforementioned probable way out, this formula again has many obstacles. First, this is also extra constitutional; secondly many in the team of Dr. Abdullah believe that Karzai himself is involved in the engineering the electoral results. Thirdly, Karzai's continuation would be hard to stomach for the countries playing leading role among the International Community in Afghanistan.

It should also be kept in mind that none of the opponents will be quickly ready to accept any settlement except for the Presidential Palace. Dr. Ghani Ahmadzai, who has calculated his resolute image, seems to be in a hurry to replace Karzai and will not be ready for any settlement which could nullify his victory. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and his supporters believe that the collaboration between IEC and his opponent stopped him from going to the Palace. He too believes he has to prevent his mandate from being stolen.

It is time for the Afghan political elite to wake up to the fact that manipulation of the process is like playing with fire. There is a very real threat to the whole system. Meanwhile terrorism is still a serious challenge for Afghanistan and the region. We can scarcely afford a political and constitutional crisis. The International Partners of Afghanistan in particular the US should take the situation seriously. We have already watched the spectacle of the military collapse of a US-allied state because of a ruling elite over-playing its hand in local sectarian politics.

Dr. Hussain Yasa is the Editor-in-Chief of the daily Outlook Afghanistan. Currently he is living in Germany in a self imposed exile. He can be reached at dr.yasa1967@gmail.com

Afghanistan- Karzai Keeps His Word

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2014-02-03T18:23:59Z

On Saturday, January 25, 2014 President Karzai announced in two different events in Kabul that he would not sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States unless they met his preconditions. Keeping up his anti American rhetoric, he declared that Bagram had become a production line turning out Taliban. He denounced US troops for detaining and humiliating innocent Afghans and forcing them upon release to stand against their people and country. Karzai was unmoved by the dossiers produced by the US and his own security apparatus containing evidence that many of the detainees are dangerous and have been involved in killing Afghan and NATO troops as well numerous civilians.

Karzai waxed lyrical on his favourite theme, the Bilateral Security Agreement. Despite the famous unending American optimism, the issue seems stuck in a cul de sac. Karzai compared the BSA to the infamous Durand Line and Gandamak agreements. Afghan nationalist historians consider these to be humiliating agreements signed under duress. Karzai in his words stopped one step short of equating the BSA with Gandamak. But his body language said it all appreciated by the Afghanistan historians. He didn't use the same wordings but his body language and tone proclaimed that signing the BSA would be as dishonourable as Emir Yaqub Khan going to a British camp in Gandamak to sign away Afghan territory and sovereignty.
Over the years Karzai has sporadically blamed the United States for many failures in Afghanistan. But he crossed a red line in the US-Islamic Forum held in Qatar on June 9-11, 2013, when he said that the US is responsible for the growing extremism in the Islamic World.

Then on October 07, 2013 talking to the BBC, Karzai lashed out at NATO, describing it as the cause of suffering for Afghans because of its role in killing innocents.
On December 10, 2013 talking to the French Newspaper “Le Monde” he, said that the US is absolutely acting as a colonial power.

On January 28, 2014 the Washington Post quoting a senior official within the government reported that Karzai believes that recent terrorist attacks were orchestrated by the US to undermine his government. Karzai made similar allegations over three years ago, when the three days Consultative Peace Jirga was attacked by the Taliban on June 02, 2010. Soon afterwards he sacked his Intelligence Chief and Interior Minister for failing to provide security to the grand meeting of Afghan elders.

The Issue of Civilian Casualties
Over the centuries the ugliest side of war has been the killing of non-combatants. One of the most reprehensible way in which this happens is when a warring group uses innocents as a human shield. The Taliban and their Al Qaeda partners already acquired a reputation for their brutal ways of dealing with civilians from the time the Movement was formed in 1994.

There have been dozens of reports of civilian casualties in Afghanistan since the start of “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)” in 2001. Many incidents are indeed tragic and civilians uninvolved in the hostilities have been killed or injured. Despite all the sales talk about precision bombing, the most advanced military sometimes gets it wrong and ordinary people suffer. But the asymmetric tactics adopted by the Taliban and Al Qaeda have deliberately increased the risks to civilians. Insurgents consciously use civilians as a human shield.

Initially after the early incidents of civilian casualties both Afghan and NATO troops tried to mitigate the risks to civilians by insisting on precise intelligence before conducting operations. But things changed around 2005. Karzai's love affair with the international community started to break up in the period before the second countrywide elections. It was realized worldwide that one of the obstacles on the path to a prosperous and peaceful Afghanistan was growing corruption. Reaction against this had boosted support for the Taliban as they started to gain ground in the rural areas. It was admitted officially and by the various non government organizations that the various layers of government, up to the Presidential Palace, were involved in a wide range of corrupt practices. Since, there was no will to fight corruption, with the passage of the time it was slowly institutionalized and infiltrated into almost every walk of life. There are many reports and pieces of research showing that corruption has gone beyond the level at which it is realistic to curb it by ordinary formal measures.

Karzai faced a challenge as he was asking for more money from international donors to be spent through the channel of his corrupt administration. The world community was reluctant. The problem was compounded by the lack of capacity of the various ministries to properly disburse their development and ordinary budgets.

Karzai highlighted the issue of civilian casualties in direct proportion to the demands for transparency and a corruption-free Afghan administration.
Just like the Taliban, Karzai chose to hide behind a human shield. From 2006 onwards there were multiple incidents in which Karzai's team announced higher civilian casualty figures than indicated by reliable reports from the field. Egged on by the President some unscrupulous people even dug fake graves to attract the attention of Media and to claim more money as compensation. Quite apart from the politics of the matter, this manipulation was deeply insulting to the real civilian casualties. Local and International media reported more than a dozen times replays of the dispute between Karzai and his international allies and no technical or diplomatic measures could reconcile their different takes on the many incidents.

The last high profile case of civilian casualties was reported on January 16, 2014 in a fierce battle in Ghorband between Afghan and NATO troops on one side and the Taliban on the other. Once again on the issue of exaggeration of casualties the Taliban and Karzai were on the same page. Karzai appointed Abdul Sattar Khawasi, a pro Taliban MP, as the head of the fact-finding commission to investigate this matter. The evidence provided to the Afghan National Security Council bizarrely drew on material collected from Taliban sources. Once again Karzai blasted the US and made Ghorband his latest excuse for not signing the BSA. Soon afterwards, the Governor of Parwan Province, another MP and members from the affected families dismissed the results of the presidential inquiry as concocted.

The Taliban Prisoners
Afghans and the world were surprised when they found that Karzai is even more keen than the Taliban on pursuing the issue of Guantanamo prisoners, captured during the OEF. There include notorious Taliban commanders who were involved in systematic massacres of the people in the Northern and central Afghanistan.

The extrajudicial release of Taliban has become more prominent after Bagram Detention Center was handed over to Karzai last year. However Karzai was presiding over the release of Taliban fighters and terrorists for many years before he got his hands on the keys to Bagram. His former Intelligence Chief admitted this fact many times even in his briefings to the open sessions of Parliament.

President Karzai never took the “War on Terror” seriously, not even in the heady days of 2001. As a leader, Karzai modeled himself on those old Mujahideen commanders who were accused of letting Osama and friends slip away from Tora Bora in December 2001. He never acted as a reliable partner to the more than 100,000 NATO combat troops in their efforts to overcome the Taliban. He desperately tried to limit the capabilities of the troops by creating obstacles in their way and objecting to detentions, home searches, night raids and air support.

Karzai's game was to use ISAF against the North rather than the Taliban. He even tried to trick the Americans into bombing General Dostam, by concocting reports that this northern figure was involved in a rebellion. It would have been a disaster if the Americans had fallen for this particular canard, although no doubt Karzai would have wept crocodile tears.

And while the US has been lavishing billions of dollars on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Karzai has never trusted his own army and is more interested in staving off an imagined coup than in leading the army against the country's enemy. Bizarrely he identifies much more with the Taliban as the army of his native community. Probably in private he watches Taliban propaganda videos and cheers as their militants blow up American humvees. He dreams of having the Taliban Movement under his command and using it to dominate Afghanistan and smash the anti-Taliban constituency politically and militarily.

Karzai calculates that by releasing Taliban insurgents from the prison he is strengthening the Taliban military. He knows that released militants go back into action. Releasing them is an act of war by someone who sees himself as commander in chief.

Reluctance in Signing BSA
Everyone in Afghanistan is aware of the importance of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US. A vast swathe of public opinion believes that it is critical for the economy and security of the country and that there is a real risk of state collapse if Afghanistan does not sign. But Karzai has used the crudest possible tactics to delay it, by posing the US as the monster rather than the ally.

There are many complex conspiracy theories about this aggressive attitude of president Karzai toward the US. The reality is much simpler. Karzai is acting out a fantasy. He is behaving like an adolescent addicted to the comic strips of his childhood, who desperately wants to look like a batman-superman hero. In the Karzai fantasy world he has a cartoon image of the heroes of Pashtun history, such as Ahmad Shah Abdali, who founded a dynasty in the second half of the eighteenth century.

There were many critics in Afghanistan over his growing anti US rhetoric, since it strengthened the Taliban's case. They have long considered America as enemy number one for ousting their regime in 2001 with the help of their previous utmost enemy the then Northern Alliance.

In addition to his growing anti US sentiments, he has also been threatening the community leaders from the Northern anti Taliban constituency, telling them that if he does not get his way, he may be obliged to bring back the Taliban. He has repeated this threat many times since he came to power in 2001 as the head of the Afghan Interim Administration. Karzai's implied message to the Non Pashtun communities was that the dismissal of the Taliban administration would not change the fundamental balance of power in the country. They were fated to live under Pashtun rule and they should be thankful to have a soft Pashtun ruler. Karzai tried to convey to the Non Pashtuns that his rule is ordained by God and brings with it divine blessings. They should rejoice since they have all those freedoms which the Taliban brutally seized from them, at least there have been no more systematic ethnic cleansing, scorched earth policy and Stone Age interpretation of religion mixed with traditions unmatched to their life style. The threat to bring back Taliban was not just directed to the Non Pashtuns but also to the International Community led by NATO.

He tried to convince the US to divert the war towards the Northern Alliance rather than concentrating on Taliban. He always considered the Taliban as his brothers, including their fugitive leader Molla Omar. He posed the Northern Anti Taliban constituency as the strategic threat to the system. This ethnocentric mindset of the president is also mentioned in “Duty” the memoire of Robert Gates, the former US Secretary of Defense. It should not be forgotten that Karzai tried hard to become one of the comrades of Molla Omar and lobbied to be the permanent representative of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan in New York. Ironically, the Taliban turned him down as incompetent and unreliable. He met with Mullah Baradar and tried to negotiate with the Taliban leadership at the time of the Taliban retreat from Kandahar in 2001 but failed to get the US to buy into the deal he wanted to offer. For a while Karzai and his associates dismissed the Taliban as useless tools because they allowed the mishandling of the Al Qaeda confrontation with the US to disrupt their campaign to conquer Afghanistan.

Karzai feels that BSA would be an obstacle in his way to reach to his dreams. He harbors illusions that the US with its huge resources might give him terms which would help him to achieve his ethnocentric agenda. In any case, he considers the BSA useless if America is just to stay in Afghanistan and train the ANSF and do counter-terrorism. After all he does not trust the ANSF and considers the terrorists his brothers.

Elections 2014
The international community is pinning hopes on the 2014 elections to consolidate Democracy in Afghanistan. But the bitter reality is that none of the elections which Karzai and his cronies have presided over since 2004 has been anywhere near to meeting international norms. The 2004 countrywide presidential polls conducted under the supervision of the UN were just a formality. The second presidential election in 2009 was marked with huge systematic rigging. But in his Goebbels-like parlance, Karzai still denounces the 2009 Election Commission's act of rejecting one million votes from stuffed ballot boxes as “foreign interference”. His blatant refusal to acknowledge that ballot box stuffing has become a feature of Karzai-era elections is as clear a declaration as you could expect that this time too he plans to tell his administration to stuff the boxes for the palace-favored candidate.

One should admire the opposition leaders for going to polls even after understanding this fact. Probably they want to test the last hope for a democratic Afghanistan.

Many hope that the upcoming Presidential Polls could be a means for a peaceful transition of power. But that is the least likely outcome as it doesn't match the Afghan ruling culture. For Karzai the upcoming elections will be nothing but another round of a systematic ballot stuffing for the candidate of his choice, who will be determined in coming weeks. Following in the steps of his predecessor rulers by staying on for life seems to be impossible. So he dreams instead of continuing his rule indirectly.
Karzai wants a free hand to manipulate the electoral process. Therefore, with another nod to Goebbels, he proclaims that he demands the Americans promise elections will be free and fair. The message is simple – back off and let me rig as I like. .

Peace Process
He was never sincere regarding the peace process to end the war in Afghanistan. For him peace is nothing more than the unity of his native community under his sole command. The few Non Pashtuns whom Karzai has ostensibly involved in the process have been systematically side-lined. He is dealing with the peace process either through his family members or his loyal comrades. Meanwhile, partly inspired by the realization that the President deliberately marginalized him and cut him out of any serious discussions on negotiations, the High Peace Council chief Sallahuddin Rabbani, the son of the non Pashtun ex-president assassinated by the Taliban on September 20, 2011, has joined the camp of the main opposition presidential candidate.

Karzai wishes that the US would use all its capabilities to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and pressurize them to accept Karzai. This is impossible. Karzai dishes out some of his harshest criticism to anyone who dares suggest that Afghanistan's conflict is fundamentally an internal one rather than international. Never mind that ninety percent of current armed clashes involve Afghan fighting against Afghan, Karzai wants to portray himself as the nationalist hero simultaneously standing up to both Pakistan and America. He also denies that the Taliban control parts of Afghanistan and believes that the sanctuaries are beyond the borders. It is the job of US to finish them by using its maximum military capability and to pressurize Pakistan to bring Taliban under his command, again an impossible task.

Conclusion

1. Karzai will continue his anti US rhetoric to curry favor among his native Pashtuns in particular the Taliban and Hizbe Islami. He is not different from them in his warped sense his community's interests.

2. Although, Karzai never missed a chance to portray the US as the villain and the spoiler in Afghanistan. But on the contrary the US diplomacy has been very resilient and they have expressed the maximum level of tolerance. But Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General on January 27, 2014 in Brussels has warned that Afghanistan may lose aid packages if Karzai fails to sign BSA. The other US European Allies have also expressed the same sentiments. On the other hand Karzai is not in the mood to be impressed by these threats. First, he cannot sign the BSA since he has already called it equal to the most shameful treaties in Afghan history. Secondly, if it is signed Karzai will not own it since signing BSA doesn't fulfill his ambitions to be enlisted in the line of Afghan heroes mentioned in the history. He considers the BSA as a betrayal and treason to his native community, avoiding that betrayal is to sell the country to the Taliban or its notorious ally Hizbe Islami.
3. The strong domestic and world pressure has affected the pace of Karzai's efforts to help the Taliban by releasing the ruthless terrorists. But it will not stop him from doing so. He has released thousands of them over the last years and he will continue to do so.

4. The world Community and the Afghans who still hope for a stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan should reaffirm their commitment that if this time the mandate of the people is stolen they will not keep silent. Even if perfect elections are impossible this time, Afghans and international community alike should resist attempts to take ballot stuffing to the level where it kills the future of democracy in Afghanistan.
5. The world and Afghans in particular the anti Taliban constituency should stand ready to face any artificially contrived crisis through which Karzai might try to bring the Taliban back into power. If Karzai could not fulfill any of his promises to lead Afghanistan towards a better future he will keep his word and handover to the Taliban as a last resort.

Dr. Hussain Yasa is the Editor-in-Chief of the daily Outlook Afghanistan. Currently he lives in Germany in a self imposed exile. He can be reached at dr.yasa@munichprocess.com

Afghanistan – The Evolving Election Scenario

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2013-09-20T05:16:09Z

Nominations for the Afghani presidency opened on the 16th September and with this milestone the country formally entered the pre-election period. Over the next seven months Afghanistan will be turned into one great reality TV show, watched by the world, while the candidates practice our unique brand of politics. In the run up to nominations, the alternating announcements of electoral coalitions and rumors that the election will not happen, have given a taste of the intricate tactics involved in Afghan politics. However the 2014 poll is different from the elections in 2004 and 2009. In both of those elections the incumbent was widely expected to win. That is the one outcome which is ruled out in the 2014 election because of the bar on the President standing for a third time. This time the election scenario involves three contests rolled into one. The first contest is between those prepared to participate in the Kabul-based political system and those trying to overthrow it by force, which boils down to the Taliban versus the rest. If any candidate is elected legitimately in April 2014 it will mark a victory for those who support democratic politics. The second contest is over the nature of the elections, between those who try to ensure that there is a popular mandate and those trying to grab control of the electoral machinery to rig the elections. The third contest is the one which has been shaping up between the emerging coalitions. It boils down to the contest between palace and opposition over how different the new team in the presidency should be from that which has struggled to rule Afghanistan over the past decade. This analysis of the evolving scenario takes a look at the current state of the three contests.

The first contest – violent extremism versus Kabul-based politics

The latest generation of jihadists is fighting to overthrow the Kabul-based political system and reject the idea of trusting elections to choose Afghanistan's leader. The most famous group in the armed opposition is the Taliban. However, as the war has continued, various Afghan factions have come to operate under the Taliban flag, with backing from jihadist circles in Pakistan and what remains of Al Qaeda's international militant alliance. Although apparently marginalized less influential than before, Hizb-e Islami leader Gulbadin Hekmatyar still operates alongside those who have preferred fighting over peaceful politics. The Taliban have a clear vision of eliminating their opponents by force. The Taliban have unambiguous faith in their ideology, life style and peculiar interpretation of religion. They do not believe in democracy and still follow their distant dream to implement a “Khilafat” headed by their Amir-ul-Mominin (The leader of faithful), the notorious Mullah Omar. They are committed to toppling the fragile system and hope to dominate Afghanistan as the victorious force after the withdrawal of the US-led ISAF.

The second contest – palace politics and popular mandate versus rigging
Karzai led regime (L'ETAT C'EST MOI)
THE RUSE OF CONSENSUS CANDIDATE – ZULMAY MEDVEDEV – MOST PLAUSIBLE MAIN STRATEGY – BUT HE HAS FALL BACK STRATEGIES ALSO

President Hamed has been ruling over Afghanistan since the fall of Taliban in late 2001. With the wholehearted support of US and its international partners, he managed to lead Afghanistan over the last decade with many positive and undesirable developments.
Following the same line of his predecessors, Karzai is deeply reluctant to step down. He is busy conceiving plans about how to remain in power indirectly through his loyalists in the palace. His body language suggests that he has not really accepted that he was elected president twice for a specific time period. Instead he seems to believe that ruling over this war torn country is his God given right.
His last two elections were flawed and in 2009 his bid to win in one round was declared fraudulent. Interestingly the world never really punished their Afghan client for his ballot stuffing and engineering of electoral results. Apparently they thought that Afghan democracy needs more time to mature. But on the contrary, in our dealing with election-rigging the whole democratization process and achievements of the twelve year international mission in Afghanistan are at stake.
The palace team of experienced election riggers has a lot of opportunities, including the flawed electoral system, the absence of an authentic census and voter list, millions of fake voter cards, unlimited resources with the partial administration and local governments, insecurity, a weak election commission. These are all aspects of the election they may seek to exploit so as to obtain the result they desire. There are hopes that the palace will be less willing or able to conduct as large scale centralized rigging as in 2009. Wisely, the donor community has already warned that any effort to alter the poll results will jeopardize Afghanistan's future aid prospects. The government would do well to take note. We now have a new election law and election stakeholders are working their way through a list of anti-fraud measures.
The second, tactic of Karzai is to divide and rule the opposition. Most of them have gathered in the “Electoral Alliance”. He is trying to pick them off by offering them political bribes.
At the same time Karzai has held off clearly endorsing any serious candidate to become his successor. He has multiple standby candidates who engage the various opposition strongmen in fake negotiation but are not serious about pursuing any real power sharing formula. Some see the lack of an anointed palace candidate as evidence of Karzai's clever game. It is just as plausible that Karzai and the palace have simply failed to get their inner team to agree on the so-called consensus figure.
Ultimately, if he could get away with it, Karzai would be open to alternatives to an election, like a Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly with delegates hand-picked by the palace) or an announcement of a state of emergency by magnifying the security issues and declaring that the overall situation doesn't support elections. He could try to buy the support of parliament for such a move through mass horse trading.
The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has already issued press release warning that that some circles are pushing for postponement of the polls.

The third contest – coalitions versus the palace
Electoral Coalition (EC)

The newly formed Electoral Coalition is mainly composed of two previous strong opposition alliances, the Afghanistan National Front (ANF) led by Ahmad Zia Massoud and the National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA) led by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. The Electoral Alliance also includes other power brokers such as Atta Mohammad Noor, the strongman of the Northern Balkh Province.
The leaders around EC are mostly old members of the Northern Alliance who resisted Taliban occupation and helped the US led coalition oust the Taliban from power. The alliance includes a few Pashtuns. But the king-makers of the EC all belong to the non Pashtun communities, the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks.
The Electoral Coalition draws its popular support through parties with significant mass base. These include Jamiat-e Islami led by Salahuddin Rabbani, the son of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the founder of the Party killed by the Taliban in September 2011. The other mass-based parties include the People's Unity Party of Afghanistan led by Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, the strongman of Hazaras and the Junbesh Party led by Gen, Abdur Rashid Dostum the leading strongman from the Northern Uzbek community.
Even though Dr. Abdullah Abdullah had announced his candidacy for the upcoming Presidential Elections much before the formation of the EC, now he says that he will follow the decision of the alliance on the issue of his candidacy. No one else from this alliance has yet stepped forward as the candidate to challenge the palace.
Many believe that the EC still lacks the faith, courage and enthusiasm to win the upcoming Presidential Elections. But the members of the EC have had their minds focused by the prospect of the post election situation, with the withdrawal of ISAF, the threat of takeover of Taliban by force, the growing sense of insecurity among the communities involved in the resistance against the Taliban and economic challenges. The contest is a survival issue.
The king-makers of the EC have conflicting interests on various issues. But their common minimum approach is the same. None of them trusts Karzai and all of them are afraid of Taliban.
Another fact cannot be ignored. Two important figures in today's EC were the main vote-getters for Karzai in the 2009 elections. And still he could not manage to get 51%. A palace endorsed candidate this time cannot draw on the same vote bank which Karzai used to scrape home last time.
Some critics suspect that the coalition may not survive the upcoming hectic days of the nomination process where the power-brokers face the all important question of who should be their joint candidate. This means that the electoral process is working towards a contest between Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and whoever the palace finally endorses as their preferred candidate.

Doctors without Borders
This is the name given to the team led by Dr. Zulmai Khalilzad, the former US ambassador to Kabul and Iraq, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai former Cabinet Minister. Ali Ahmad Jalali, the former Interior Minister (also an American citizen) and Qayoum Karzai, the elder brother of President Karzai. All of them wished to become the next president but none of them has any mass support to pose a reasonable challenge to the EC.
They have been busy in trying to win the support of strongmen from non Pashtun communities. But at the end of the day it seems that they are not successful to do so.

Right and Justice Party
The Party is led by Hanif Atmar, the former Cabinet Minister. At its formation two years back the party which mainly consisted of the defectors from other parties. It has grown up to the level where it should be taken seriously. But still many believe that it lacks the mass support to have a chance in the presidential elections. Although, Atmar has been in the opposition, he has refrained from joining any non-Pashtun led opposition alliance – neither the ANF nor the NCA.
His reluctance to join those main opposition alliances could be due to his ambition to lead the opposition or a probable fear of provocation Pashtuns by shaking hands with the anti Taliban figures or parties. Nevertheless he was an active member of the Consultative Council of 23 opposition Political parties, most of them now in the EC. Atmar is a resilient politician and a talented technocrat who has tried desperately to gain the support of the same king-makers of the non Pashtun communities but has so far been unsuccessful. He has another problem which is not usually discussed on the open forums. He belongs to the Eastern province of Laghman. The elders of Southern Pashtun tribes seem to be reluctant to shift power from South to East although both are Pashtuns.

Afghanistan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Millat)
It is led by Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, the current Minister of Commerce. Afghan Millat has a long history in Afghan Politics. The Party is famous for its ultra Pashtun ethnocentrism but it denies the perception and claims that the party has a comprehensive national agenda.
Afghan Millat has good support among the Pashtun liberals and educated class. But Dr. Ahady's misfortune is that the class does not have any decisive role for the time being in shaping Pashtun politics. He has also announced he is a candidate. On the other hand president Karzai is blamed for the fragmentation of the party into various factions. In brief the Party is not in a position to emerge as a significant player of this process
There are few more alliances and parties wish to play role in the process but for the time being most of the analysts don't believe any significant role from smaller groups.

Conclusion
We can draw six main conclusions from this review of the election scenario.
Firstly, the political system operating in Kabul is a hybrid one in which both political parties and regional power-brokers play a key role in mobilizing electoral support. Despite ten years of effort by the Afghan government to restrict the growth of political parties and to malign them as responsible for the conflict, Afghan parties have survived. The government's attempt to establish a non-party system has failed.
Secondly, President Karzai seems set to become Afghanistan's Musharraf. The presidential palace has failed to come up with a credible succession strategy. Neither have they found a way of keeping Karzai in power nor have they found a viable candidate who can keep together the hotchpotch of interests which have gathered in the palace in recent years. Like Musharraf, Karzai has a strong sense of self-importance and seems determined to scheme until the end. But the President and the world are on course to discover that, just like Musharraf, Karzai is dispensable.
Thirdly, the main focus for Karzai's political scheming has now become his effort to break up the Electoral Alliance. So far all efforts to seduce its members have failed and this is starting to look like Karzai's toughest political challenge.
Fourthly postponing the election, long favored by some palace players as a way of staying on in power a bit longer, seems no longer a serious option. Courtiers periodically raise alarms about security in the Pashtun south, argue that elections are impossible or float ideas of a transitional government. But the momentum in the country towards elections has built up and Afghanistan's international donors have signaled that they will not tolerate messing with the timetable. Elections are never pretty, but they are better than any available alternative.
Fifthly, the electoral arithmetic is such that Afghanistan now has a real prospect of electing a non-Pashtun president. This of course would go directly against the oft-stated assumption that only a Pashtun is fit to run the country. Karzai's legacy may well end up be a mixture of blame and credit as the Pashtun who handed power to someone from the north. If a non-Pashtun is elected, it will be as a result of the palace's botched attempts at divide and rule.
Sixthly, precisely because palace scheming has not yet delivered a convincing political strategy to assure continuity there is still a risk of Karzai reverting to his spoiling behaviour with gross interference in the electoral process. Friends of Afghanistan would be well-advised to be ready to deal with this eventuality. Afghanistan's lawful opposition faces the same dilemma – their political strategy must include contingency planning for dealing with presidential sabotage of the process. Naivety does not pay in Afghanistan.

Dr. Hussain Yasa is the Chief Editor of the daily Outlook Afghanistan and the Coordinator of the Munich Process

Pakistan: Elections with Fragmented mandate

Dr. Hussain Yasa — 2013-05-11T01:20:38Z

Today, the people of Pakistan are going to take an important political decision for its leadership for the next five years. Today's elections seem to be the most interesting one in the recent history of Pakistan in particular after two long tenures of the army rule (Gen. Zia-ul-Haq- 1977 to 1988 and Gen. Pervez Musharaf- 1999 to 2008). The elections are for the 14th national and provincial assemblies of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan vote for 372 seats of the lower house of the national assembly and 728 seat of the 4 provincial assemblies. In these elections the unpredictability is the most important factor which further makes the political scenario more interesting. In the previous elections, it was easy to assess the results in advance since traditionally there were always clear contests between the liberals (PPP, MQM, ANP) and pro-establishment and orthodox politico-religious parties (PML, JUI, JI etc.).
But these elections has become more attractive by the entrance of a third party “Pakistan Tehrek-e Insaf or PTI” (movement for justice) led by cricketer turned politician, Imran Khan. Seventeen years back in 1996 when he established his party no one believed that one day he will be one of the serious contestant for the premiership of Pakistan.

Although, this elections is still full of ambiguities but the probable post election scenario might not be optimistic for an ordinary Pakistani citizen for a change that could play a determined role in the restoration of political and economic stability.

Important Players

Pakistan People's Party- Since its inception in 1967, PPP in Pakistan's recent history remained the only political party, having grass root level representation having liberal democratic norms. The charisma of its founding leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto based its manifesto on secularism and social equality, and ruled over the hearts and minds of the millions of Pakistanis for decades. It gained power for four times and still it is supposed to have its core support intact particularly in the second largest province of Sindh. The last rule of the party, it indeed has been tainted by the allegations of corruption and the involvement of its ministers in sectarian activities and vandalism in Balochistan and Sindh. The quality of its representatives is said to have declined since the assassination of its world fame chairperson Benazir Bhutto. Vague reports also indicated that Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the son of slain Benazir have had differed with the views of his father, co-chairman Asif Zardari, over the allocation of tickets to infamous party representatives but later reconciled with the situation to resolve it in times ahead.

While, precisely the ruling PPP could not deliver the way people expected but ruling over Pakistan in such a critical period was not an easy task. Growing terrorism, energy crisis, economic decline, corruption and ill-governance were the main causes of the seriously drawdown of the Party graph.

After the assassination of Benazir Buttho in a suicide attack on December 27, 2008, the party faced an un-compensable loss but her husband Asif Ali Zardari, the PPP's co-chairman and the incumbent president of the country to some extend managed to keep party united and gained the power under a huge public sentiments voted for PPP as a sign of dedication to Benazir Bhutto. In spite of shortage of number for a simple majority, PPP successfully completed its constitutional tenure with the help of its coalition partners. In the last countrywide general elections in 2008 PPP scored 125 seats including the reserved seats of women, minorities and 7 independent winners. The party still enjoys mass support all over Pakistan with its stronghold Sindh province where still no other party could replace it. However, growing support for MQM's middle class leadership may create dents in the in PPP influence areas in interior urban Sindh. The Sindh province has 75 seats in the lower house of national assembly.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) - Although, the party claims to be the extension of the All India Muslim League under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah that led the Muslims of sub-continent India to establish Pakistan, a separate country for the Indian Muslim but due to almost a dozen parties under the same name it is a bit difficult to confirm the claim.

In fact the party was founded by Fida Mohammad Khan, a veteran activist for the freedom of Pakistan and served as the Governor of the then North West Frontier (Now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) Province for three years under the military regime of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ( 1985- 1988). After his retirement from politics Nawaz Sharif who was serving as the Secretary General of the party became the president of the party.
Nawaz Sharif was always considered as the pro-establishment politician till 1997. In the general elections held on February 1997 his party scored a landslide victory by two third majorities, a record in the history of Pakistan. After that historic win, Nawaz Sharif detached himself from military establishment and tried to emerge as a real national politician. To gain that status he paid a big prize of the dismissal of his government and imprisonment by Gen. Pervez Musharaf as well as accepted exile after a deal with Gen. Musharaf and left for Saudi Arabia where he spent almost a decade.

There are reports of Nawaz Sharif to have developed intimacy with Osama bin Laden in mid-80's and for short period served as a courier between Osama and CIA. Late JI head, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, in one of his interviews also confirmed that Nawaz Sharif had received monetary support from Bin Laden in his effort to gain overwhelming majority support in 1997 election. During his last rule in Punjab, his brother Shahbaz Sharif managed to release at least more than 190 Al Qaeda affiliated Lashkar e-Jhangvi terrorists, including Malik Ishaq. Malik Ishaq then reported have arranged and supported the biggest sectarian attacks in Balochistan and Sindh. In the recent ongoing election campaign, the Taliban and other sectarian terrorist out fits opposed to the sys democratic franchise did not differentiate between liberal and orthodox religious political parties leaving only PML (N) which they exempted from their attacks. In Balochistan attacks on PML (N) were from secessionist groups and not from Taliban.
PML-N gained 92 seats in the 2008 elections as well a clear majority in Punjab assembly where it ruled over the last constitutional tenure. The stronghold of this party is Punjab with the total seats of 183, in which PML-N feels threatened to be denied by PTI. Vague reports have suggested that the fire which broke out in the Municipal Plaza in Punjab capital of Lahore on Thursday May 10, 2013, two day prior to general elections, claiming 23 lives so far, contained the files of Major PML (N) projects including Metro Bus Service. If true, it confirms the fears of Sharif brothers against the growing support of PTI in Punjab ahead of investigation of cases expected in future in case PTI gains majority in Punjab the most populated province of Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehrik-e Insaf (PTI) - This party has gained considerable momentum over the last two years. Imran khan, once the hero of the Pakistan cricket who brought the 1992 champion trophy of the Cricket World Cup—established PTI in February 1996.
This party was never considered as a power broker in the Pakistani politics since last couple of years but now turned as one of the strongest party challenging the aforementioned two main parties. The huge mass rallies of PTI over the last two years hiked the graph of Imran Khan as one of the emerging national leaders. Pre-pole postal voting in Pakistan Army and other civilian government officials serving in areas other than their constituencies have also indicated a trend of mass drift of opinion in the favor of PTI i.e. 85 percent of total votes received so far.

Many believe that Imran Khan led PTI is the new venture of the Pakistan military establishment. This analysis is based on two reasons first the defection the pro establishment politician from the other main stream national parties, who ultimately joined PTI later on and secondly military establishment now doesn't feel comfortable with both the other main parties mentioned earlier. But two Questions remain unheard; if PTI doesn't gain a clear majority, how will it perform in opposition under its arch rival PML (N)? Secondly, if it succeeds in elections with a clear majority; how will it cope with Zardari as president already powerful in the Senate?

This party has absorbed significant number of Pakistani youth with its anti corruption slogan and new power structured based on a philosophy of a moderate Islamic welfare society.

Others- Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) which is based mainly in the urban areas of Sind province has been playing an important role in the national politics. It represents mostly the middle class of the main cities of Karachi, the main economic hub of Pakistan and Haiderabad. MQM with its charismatic leader Altaf Hussain, now a British citizen based in London has been considered as the most organized party of Pakistan. It has been enjoying the clear mandate of Karachi and Haiderabad partially.
This is a secular party famous with its anti-Taliban stance and trying to invite the attention of Pakistani people toward the Talibanization of urban areas in particular Karachi. MQM was one of the coalition partners during the governments run under the supervision of Gen. Musharaf as well as enjoyed power in a close collaboration with PPP in Sindh and Islamabad. It is also trying to expand itself in other parts of Pakistan but most of the analysts still think that MQM may remain to its traditional power base.

Awami National Party (ANP) is the continuation of historical movement of Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan also famous as Bacha Khan or Sarhadi Gandhi. The party enjoys the support of secular nationalist class of Pashtuns in Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa and to some extend in Balochistan provinces. Although, it has some roots in metropolitan city of Karachi too but it has never been considered as an effective party in the power politics there.
ANP has seen many ups and downs in its history and after a long period again emerged as the biggest party of the Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa province and ruled over there in coalition with PPP since last five years.

Jamiate Ulemaye Islam (F) has been the strongest among the religious parties of Pakistan with its roots in Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa and Balochistan provinces. Moulana Fazlu Rehman is an experienced politician, succeeded party from his father Moulana Mufti Mehmoud. JUI (F) is has been a pro Taliban party and Moulana himself was considered as the spiritual father of Taliban, ruled over Afghanistan.
Jamate Islami (JI) is another ultra religious party with extra ordinary organized student wing all over Pakistan but it is the misfortune of this party that could not covert its huge student base support into a reliable vote bank.
In addition to above mentioned parties there many more small parties which are playing roles in their localities in particular Balochistan province but on the level of national politics their part is more symbolic in nature.

The terrorism factor- there is no shadow of any doubt that Pakistani security agencies seem to be helpless in facing the menace of terrorism. The resonance of North Wazistan, the main hub for the Pak-Afghan Taliban and banned fanatic religious organizations as well many other international terrorist outfits has seriously under shadowed every walks of life in Pakistan. How the Pakistani concerned authorities will deal with this challenge is another question but it has now involved in the move to divert the mandate of the people by targeting the moderate parties. Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has announced openly that they will not allow the moderate parties to campaign for the General Elections.
Three main moderate secular parties PPP, ANP and MQM have been the prime targets of TTP. None of the parties could run their election campaign properly. These parties blame TTP for bargaining with right wing parties to facilitate their campaign by preventing the moderate parties from going among the voters.

Conclusion
The present scenario and the pre-poll assessments don't show a positive picture of the next parliament of Pakistan. The current picture shows a badly fragmented parliament after the results of today's elections.

It seems that the ruling Pakistan People's Party may lose its previous mandate but will remain as one of the main parties with around 50-55 seats in the lower house as well as still a majority party in the senate. It will retain its mandate in Sindh with minor injuries but may continue with the provincial government.

Although, in the failure of PPP government many visible and invisible factors may have role but still many believe in the political guts of President Zardari who successfully make the other parties dance as per his music in the past. It is said that Zardari may also get the advantage of the scattered mandate and think of a broader coalition with only prime minister from his party and the rest of the cabinet from other parties provided invisible forces not stop him from doing so.

Pre-poll assessment in Pakistan and the abroad consider PML-N as the strongest of all and judge it as the biggest party in the next parliament of Pakistan since it enjoys the big support in Punjab province, the main chessboard of the Pakistan politics. But no one believes that it will score even simple majority and it will be difficult to gain more than 80 seats with all its strength. As well no one doubts that it will not lose the next provincial government of Punjab.

There is no doubt that PTI will be another major force in the next Pakistani parliament but still it may remain a distant dream for Imran Khan to sweep the elections. If it gained up to 40-45 seats it could be new change in the Pakistani politics as an emerging third force. Analysts also think that if the turnout grew from traditionally 45% to 55-60% PTI may be the sole benefiter of the situation and may perform remarkably. Many anticipate that PTI will not only break the main vote bank of PML-N but also knock equally to PPP votes in upper Punjab. However, in southern Punjab PPP and PML-N will remain as the main contenders.

MQM still seems to maintain its mandate in Sindh particularly Karachi City and its status in the parliament may not be changed. In the previous parliament it was the 4th major block. PTI will likely emerge as third political force in Pakistan replacing PML-Q after the elections.

ANP-PPP coalition may lose considerably in Khyber Pakhtukhuwa since PTI, JUI and PML-N may seriously cut their vote bank. But both JUI and ANP may not be able score more than 15 seats.

The effect of Pakistan Elections over Afghanistan

If the right wing parties manage to form the next government of Pakistan it might not be a good message for Afghanistan. If Nawaz Sharif is elected as the next premier of Pakistan the wave of terrorism may calm down in Pakistan but it will likely divert to Afghanistan since some portions of Taliban seem to be now out of control and determine their own policies. PML-N has been one of the parties which enjoyed a full election campaign without any minor incident and an undeclared sympathy of Taliban was observed throughout its campaign. The main targets of Taliban were all those political parties in opposition with PML-N.

If by chance the power remains in the hands of the present coalition, again Afghanistan may not be able to enjoy the dream of decline in violence. In that case other factors may play deteriorating role.

The way the current leadership of Afghanistan leading the country there could be many reasons domestically and internationally for the mishap, the Afghans will continue to face.

Dr. Hussain Yasa is the Editor in Chief of the Daily outlook Afghanistan

کابل پرس

The Political Aspects of APTTA

Table of contents

Abstract

Introduction

From “ATTA” to “APTTA”

Informal Trade

APTTA and India

Another angle

Concluding Remarks

How the Taliban Chose the Bullet Over the Ballot?

Table of contents

Abstract

Preface

Hurdles so far

Is there any ideal model of polity in the Islamic history?

What about the present-day Islamic countries?

What are Taliban afraid of?

The probable dream of Taliban

The probable model for Taliban

Are these models applicable in Afghanistan of 21st century?

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

NOTES

#KabulProtest was historic. Now, it's for the govt to take on Taliban, IS

Mullah Omar's death might be bad news for Afghanistan

A concocted mandate

Afghanistan- Karzai Keeps His Word

Afghanistan – The Evolving Election Scenario

Pakistan: Elections with Fragmented mandate